Abstract.
For any collection of sets of reals C, let C-DET be the statement that all sets of reals in C axe determined. In this paper we study questions of the form: For given C Q C, when is C'-DET equivalent, equiconsistent or strictly stronger in consistency strength than C-DET (modulo ZFC)? We focus especially on classes C contained in the projective sets.
1. Introduction. 1.1. For any set A e u" = R (= the set of "reals"), consider the associated infinite game GA : I a(0) a (2) ..., II «(1) a (3) in which player I wins if a e A, and II wins otherwise. We call A determined if the corresponding game GA is determined, i.e. if either player I or player II has a winning strategy. For any class of sets fwe abbreviate by 'g'-DET the statement that every set of reals A e W is determined. The Definable Determinacy Hypothesis is the assertion that every set of reals which is ordinal-definable from a countable sequence of ordinals is determined, i.e. if-DET for <ë= OD(ORD"), where ORD = the class of ordinals. This hypothesis is being considered as a plausible candidate for a strong set theoretical axiom transcending the limits of classical ZFC set theory. With this motivation an extensive study has been made over the last two decades of its consequences for the structure theory of the continuum, its relationships to other proposed strong axioms of set theory, particularly large cardinal hypotheses, and its logical strength. The Definable Determinacy Hypothesis naturally ramifies in a (nonnecessarily strict) hierarchy of hypotheses #-DET for various #contained in OD(ORD"). Our main concern in this paper is the analysis of this hierarchy, particularly focusing on its lower levels, where the classes # contain only projective sets of reals. Typical questions we will be studying are of the form: For given %'e <£' as above, when is fé"-DET equivalent, equiconsistent or strictly stronger in consistency strength than fé'-DET (modulo ZFC) ? We think that such a logical analysis is helpful in providing new insights on the nature and the plausibility of consistency of this powerful hypothesis.
1.2. To put things in perspective, we will review first some known results on the relative consistency strength of determinacy hypotheses. It is convenient to summarize this information in the form of a table. The first column lists progressively stronger (not necessarily strictly) forms of determinacy relative to the base theory ZFC. The notation «-DET <=> «"-DET means therefore that ZFC 1= «-DET « «'-DET, while the notation «'-DET < «'-DET means that «"-DET is consistencywise stronger than ^-DET, i.e.
ZFC + «"-DET 1= Con(ZFC + «'-DET).
Finally «"-DET * «"-DET means that ZFC + «'-DET is equiconsistent with ZFC + «"-DET. The notation for the various classes used is standard, but we explain it anyway after the table.
The second column in the table lists large cardinal hypotheses known to have some connections with the corresponding determinacy hypotheses appearing in the same row. (Our notational conventions for <=> and < apply here as well.) This provides a calibration of the strength of the corresponding determinacy hypotheses in the scale of large cardinal axioms (see [KM] ).
Following the table we also give the appropriate references for the results contained in it.
As usual 2*, nj,, A1,, denote the standard projective pointclasses (see [Mol] ). The pointclass £ -II} for £ < ux is defined as follows:
A e | -n} <=> There is a sequence A»,Af,...,An,... (,,<£) of II} sets such that setting A^= 0 we have:
x e A <=> least ij < £ with x e Av is odd.
The pointclass 2°(II}) consists of all countable unions of boolean combinations of FT} sets (similarly we can define 2^(11}) for £ < ux). By s/(Tl\) we denote the pointclass of all sets obtained by applying the classical operations#(see [Mol] ) to n} sets.
Beyond the projective level, the pointclass HYP consists of all hyperprojective sets and the pointclass IND of all the inductive sets of reals (see [Mol] ). Finally L(R) is the smallest inner model of ZF containing all the reals.
From the results in this table, (1) follows from combined work of Martin [Mai] and Harrington [H] , while (2) is due to Martin [Ma2] . Further (3), (4) are proved in Simms [Si] . For an extensive study of the relationship of various forms of T-DET, for T a pointclass at low levels of A\ and the theory of Mitchell models [Mil, Mi2] , see Steel [Stl] . Theorem (5) and (6) are due to Martin [Ma2, Ma3] . 
The equivalences (7) are due to Martin [Ma4] . In §5 (Theorem 5.1) we give a simple new proof of a more general result including these theorems. The strict relations (8) were proved by Martin [Ma5] , while (9) are due to Kechris and Moschovakis (see [KeM] ). Moschovakis proved (10) (see [KeM] ) and (12) (see [Mo2] ), while it is not clear who first proved (11).
The last equiconsistency theorem (13), a folklore result, is actually only one part of the following:
Theorem (Folklore).
The following theories are equiconsistent:
(i)ZFC + OD(ORDw)-DET.
(
ii)ZFC + L(R)-DET. (iii) ZF + DC + L(R)-DET. (iv) ZF + DC + AD + V = L(R). (v) ZF + DC + AD.
Here AD (the "Axiom of Determinacy") is the assertion power(R)-DET. Actually by a recent result of Kechris [Kel] ZF + AD + V = L(R) => DC. 
Thus the preceding list of equiconsistencies can be extended by
Here of course (Ai)L<R) is the class of all sets of reals which are A\ in L(R). This reduction from L(R)-DET to just (Ai)¿(R)-DET could be of some importance in attempts to prove the consistency of the Definable Determinacy Hypothesis from, say, large cardinal hypotheses, since one would only have to deal with sets which are (A2,)L(R). By the results of Martin and Steel (see [MMS and MSt] ) these sets admit a very nice normal form, namely (22)L(R> = DRI1\, where £)R is the real game quantifier, so they may be amenable to some kind of analysis.
Modulo a small improvement, which we will now explain, the reduction to (A^^-DET is best possible. 
1.3. There is an interesting phenomenon that occurs in the lowest levels of the preceding hierarchy, which can be seen easily by focusing on the " lightface" versions of some of the results we mentioned before. For instance we have: Table 2 n}-DET « 0* exists 
implies the existence of inner models with measurable cardinals, thus also the consistency of Vx e R (x* exists), i.e. the consistency of n}-DET (boldface!). So (co2 + 1 -n{)-DET > n}-DET.
Similarly for the higher levels of the £ -IIJ hierarchy, and a little beyond. So we see that at the lowest levels (well within A^), T-DET for a boldface pointclass T is strictly weaker than T'-DET for some slightly bigger lightface pointclass I". Could this persist higher up, for instance throughout the projective hierarchy so that, as H. Friedman asked, PD = Projective Determinancy = U2j,-DET n is equiconsistent to its lightface version U" 2j,-DET? The answer (in the negative) is given in the next theorem which shows surprisingly that the lightface hierarchy of determinacy hypotheses suddenly collapses at the level of A^-DET. (Compare this with the collapse of the boldface hierarchy at the level of ( A2)L(R)-DET). Here OD is of course the class of all ordinal definable sets, so that OD-DET is the maximal lightface determinacy hypothesis.
Again except for a small further reduction to provable A:2 determinacy the above result is best possible. More precisely we have the following:
Theorem (part of 4.2). (a) The following theories are equiconsistent:
(i) ZFC + OD-DET.
(ii)ZFC + Pr AVDET Schema, (b) For each N, ZFC + Pr AVDET Schema V-Con(ZFC + Pr^-DET).
We define Pr^A^ and Pr AVDET Schema as in §1.2, i.e. A e R is Pr^A^ if there are formulas <p(a), i>(a) respectively in 22, Yl\ such that ZF^ + DC I-<p <=> \p and A = {a e R: <p(a)}. Theorem 4.1 and Martin's result (5) in Table 1 place an upper bound in terms of large cardinals to the probability of explicitly describing in ZFC an undetermined game. If we assume the consistency of the existence of a nontrivial iterable elementary embedding;: Vx -» Vx, then we have the consistency of OD-DET, so we cannot hope to establish a contradiction from the Definable Determinacy Hypothesis by actually exhibiting explicitly an undetermined game. Then one can concentrate on other possible approaches for attacking the consistency of this hypothesis. For instance, there is still a possibility that by pursuing further the already extensive structure theory of the continuum revealed by the Definable Determinacy Hypothesis, a contradiction will be discovered. In view of the way in which determinacy hypotheses are used in establishing these results (take for instance the Periodicity Theorems, [Mol, Chapter 6]) one could not necessarily pinpoint an explicit undetermined game if such a contradiction arose. There could be for instance a definable family {Aa}aeR of games, so that one of them is undetermined, but we cannot explicitly specify which one.
1.4. We can actually establish the following result about the structure of the inner models L[x] for x e R, which easily implies Theorem 4.1. It can be viewed as an analog of Theorem 2.1 for the models L[x], instead of L(R). 1.5. We return now to reconsider the phenomenon of the interplay between lightface and boldface determinacy hypotheses at low levels of AVDET in the light of the preceding results. The next theorem shows that this phenomenon persists to the maximum extent allowed by the already established constraints. Thus PrAx2-DET Schema is essentially a maximal determinacy hypothesis for which the lightface and boldface forms are equiconsistent (it follows from the remarks in §4 that A'2-DET is stronger that OD-DET).
Again every fixed level of provable A:2 determinacy is weaker, in view of the following theorem. (Note the lightface hypothesis and boldface conclusion!) 1.6. We consider finally hierarchy theorems. Given pointclasses T, T' definable, say in ZFC, when can we assert that T'-DET > T-DET? We will study two main cases: (a) Lightface pointclasses contained in A*2 vs. similar boldface ones, and (b) Boldface pointclasses contained in the projective sets. Various examples of hierarchy theorems under (b) were given in Table 1 , and we have seen some examples for (a) in § §1.3 and 1.5.
Actually we prove a general hierarchy theorem which covers both these cases and which gives in general best possible results. It is basically a generalization of the results of Martin in [Ma5] . We state our theorem and its implications precisely in §6.6, but we can now discuss its intuitive content in a somewhat less rigorous form. Intuitively, our theorem asserts the following: If A is a given "reasonable" self-dual pointclass contained strictly within the projective pointsets U"2*, such that A has the scale property (even in a slightly weaker sense than usual), then there is a single explicitly definable game G, such that if G is determined, the theory "ZFC + A-DET" has a countable transitive model. The game G will lie "just beyond" A. In this way, we show that if T is a lightface pointclass "just beyond" A, then T-DET > A-DET. "Just beyond" basically means here that T has some reasonable closure properties, and contains a universal set for A.
Let us see what this theorem says in the two cases (a), (b). (a) Let T0 ç A\ be a given boldface pointclass. To obtain a lightface pointclass Tx e A\ with r,-DET > ro-DET we need only go to a I\ "just beyond" a self-dual "reasonable" pointclass A containing T0, such that A has the scale property (in a weak sense), and this is the crucial condition. Such a A, Tx can always be found and will be also included in AV A^ respectively: For instance, if T0 = n} then we can take A = U"(co • n -11}) (by Steel [St2] this class has the weak scale property that we need), and so Tx = (co2 + 1) -Yl\ is enough (and even less-see the Theorem in 8.1). Since (in ZF + DC) IIJ-DET =» (to • n -II})-DET V« < co, this is a best possible estimate which demonstrates that our hierarchy theorem is in general best possible. In §8 we look at other concrete hierarchy theorems that can be obtained by applying the general theorem within the context of AV (b) Assume now that we start with a boldface pointclass T0 3 22. Our general hierarchy theorem seems at first glance to be contrary to the preceding results mentioned in this introduction. For if A is a "reasonable" self-dual pointclass containing ro, with the (weak) scale property, then there is a single ordinal definable game G "just beyond" A such that the determinacy of G implies the consistency of "ZFC + A-DET" and thus of "ZFC + ro-DET". In particular ZFC + OD-DET h Con(ZFC + AVDET), while it follows easily from our results in §4 (see remarks following Theorem 4.2), that ZFC + A^-DET is stronger than ZFC + OD-DET.
If one analyzes the situation one gets the following: ZFC + OD-DET cannot prove (except via an inconsistency) that there is a class A containing 22 and satisfying the hypotheses of our theorem, of which the crucial one is the (weak) scale property.
However, one can use various boldface determinacy hypotheses to obtain such classes A with the scale property. Let us consider a few examples.
(i) Assuming Vx e R (x* exists) one can show (see [St2, Mol, 6E.15] ) that A = U" D(u • n -n}), where D is the game quantifier on co, has the (weak) scale property, as well as all the other simple properties required by our theory. Thus if Tx is any lightface class "just beyond" A, e.g. Tx = £>(co2 + 1 -nj), then Vx e R (x* exists) + rrDET > A-DET, License or copyright restrictions may apply to redistribution; see https://www.ams.org/journal-terms-of-use in particular Vx g R (x* exists) + rrDET > AVDET.
As an immediate corollary A^-DET > AVDET (Martin [5] ), see Table 1 .
By recent results of Kechris and Woodin [KeW] , ZF + DC + AVDET =»\Jo(a-n-I1})-DET, n so this hierarchy theorem is best possible here as well.
(ii) By generalizing (i) we have for instance that if for each k > 0 we let Rk = \J(oo^_^(u-n-u\ 
where Tk+l is "just beyond" Rk+X, for example Tk+X could be taken to be 5_^(co2 + 1 -n}).
Note that R0 = U"(co • n -II}) and so by Martin-Harrington, in ZF + DC, Vx e R (x* exists) « R0-DET.
(For k odd, it is shown in [KeW] , that, in ZF + DC, R^-DET « 2i+rDET, so we have for odd k that 2^+1-DET + I\+1-DET > 2^+2-DET). In particular, for k > 0
so these results are a sharpening of the hierarchy results for projective pointclasses in Table 1 . One can easily multiply now these examples ad infini turn. The general moral is that within the projective hierarchy every boldface form of determinacy is consistencywise weaker than the conjunction of a much weaker boldface form together with a slightly higher lightface form.
Our main hierarchy theorem points out an interesting connection between the levels at which the scale property holds and the levels at which consistencywise stronger form of determinacy hypotheses are obtained. We have seen by examples that this is in general best possible, but it seems quite likely that it is always best possible, although a clear formulation of this conjecture and a proof of it are lacking at this moment.
1.7. We have divided the rest of this paper in two parts. The first ( § §2-5) contains the main equiconsistency results explained in § §1.1-1.5, while the second part ( § §6-8) is devoted to the main hierarchy theorem and its implications.
In general we follow standard set theoretic notation and terminology. We refer the reader to Moschovakis' book [Mol] for concepts and results in descriptive set theory that we do not explicitly describe in this paper.
Part I : Equiconsistency Results

AD reduced to A}-DET in L(R). We start with
Assuming ZF + DC + V = L(R), let P(A) <=> A e R and A is not determined.
Clearly P is a projective predicate on power(R). Thus Theorem 2.1 is an immediate consequence of the following basis theorem for L(R). Theorem 2.2. Assume ZF + DC + V = L(R). If P(A) is a 22 predicate on power(R), then 1A P(A) => 3A e A\ P(A).
Proof. Work in ZF + DC + V = L(R). As every 22 predicate P(A) has the form 3B R(A, B), with R projective, assume without loss of generality that P(A) is already projective. Since V = L(R), by standard results there is a definable (with no onto parameters) function F: ORD XR->K Thus we have that 3£3a P(F(£, a)). Let X be at least such that
where N is a fixed large enough integer. A variant of the usual proof of the Skolem-Löwenheim theorem shows that X < 0, where
There is a surjection tr: R -> £ >.
Let a0 e R be such that LX(R) I-3£ P(F(£, a0)). Finally let
Clearly LX(R) 1= P(C), and since P is projective we have by absoluteness that P(C) holds as well. Now to see that C e A\ note that if we abbreviate
Since the structures LX(R) for X < 0 can be coded in a straightforward fashion by sets of reals, this shows that C e 22. A similar expression for ~ C shows that ~ C is also 22, so C e A2 and we are done.
We show now that the reduction from L(R)-DET to (A21)L(R)-DET can be further improved to an optimal form. Lx (R) 1= "For some (£0, ß0) e ORD X R,
determined Aa e F(£,ß))". As in the preceding proofs we can find, working in ZFC + Pr(A})L(R)-DET Schema, a a < 0L(R) such that LX(R) I-"ZFW + DC + V = L(R) + AD".
Pick |80eR such that LX(v(R) 1= 3£(F(£, ß0) is undetermined). Then if a e
Let M = HOD^W, M' = {x e M: rankw(x) < cof*<R>}. Since Solovay's proof (see [Ke2] ) that ZF + DC + AD r-"co, is measurable" shows also that ZF + DC + AD I-"the cox of the universe is measurable in HOD", it follows that cof,i(R) is measurable in M, so M' r-= ZFC (we are assuming here that N has been chosen large enough). So it is enough to check that M \= Pr^(A21)¿(R)-DET. So let <p, ip be respectively 2X2, U2 formulas such that M\="ZFN + DC h-<pL(R) « ^W", and let i80eMbea fixed real. We want to prove that Mt="{a: <p:L(R)(a,ß0)} is determined".
Since M is a standard model (therefore in particular an co-model), we have that ZF^ + DC I-r/<R> « xpL(R) and so LX(R) 1= <r/(R> <=-^R\ So LX(R) 1= "{a: r/-<R>(a,j80)} = {a: i//L(R)(a, j80)} is a A2(/?0)L<R> set". As also LX(R) N " { a: cpL(R)(a, ß0)} is determined", assume without loss of generality that LX(R) 1= "I has a winning strategy for [a: <pL(R)(a, ß0)}".
By the work of Martin, Moschovakis and Steel (see [MMS, MSt] ), we have that ZF + AD + DC + V = L(R) h-"Every nonempty 22(/3) set of reals A contains a A\(ß) member". So (again assuming N is large enough) we have that LX(R) 1= "I has a winning strategy a for [a: <pL(R)(«, ß0)} which lies in HOD".
It is finally enough to check that M \= "a is a winning strategy for the player I for {a, <pL(R)(a, ß0))". This however follows immediately from the following corollary of the work in [MSt] , noticed by Woodin.
Lemma. Assume ZF + AD + DC + V = L(R). For every 22 formula <p and
parameter a e HOD, we have <p(a) => HOD \= <p(a).
Proof of the lemma. Work in ZF + AD + DC + V = L(R). By [MSt] 
is a 22(a) predicate on power(R), then 3A P(A) => 3A e A\(a)P(A).
So if cp(a) <=> 3A P(A, a), where P is analytical, then <p(a) => 1A e A2(a)P(,4, a). It is easy now to verify using the fact that every nonempty A\(ß) set of reals contains a A\(ß) member that for a e HOD, A e A2x(a) we have P(A, a) => HOD \= P(A n HOD, a), which completes our proof of the lemma and the theorem. Thus 3z0Vy > rzo(1^(>') is defined).
Otherwise there is a w0 such that for all v > T w0 there is y ^ Tv with #(j>) < #(u). This clearly leads to an infinite descending chain of ordinals.
Consider now the formula < OD defining the canonical wellordering of OD sets in ZF^ + AC. Let <p(a) be the formula defining the <OD-least undetermined OD sets of reals, if such exists, and 0 otherwise, i.e. <p(a) <=> 14 e OD{A e R A A is not determined AVB <odA(B çR=> £ is determined) Aae A).
Define then the following game G:
where (a, ß) = (a(0), ß(0),...) and similarly for (a, ß, y). This is a 22 game, so it is determined. Say I has a winning strategy a (the argument is similar for II). Let v0 > Ta be such that for x > Tv0, d(x) is defined and #(x) > d(v0). We claim that L9{Vo)[v0] \="{x: <p(a)} is determined", which is a contradiction, since ¿*<«,0>K]°*= ^OD-DET. so it is enough to show that
to demonstrate that this is a winning strategy for I in (a: <p(a)}, within LHv }[i;0]. Since L<H»oA(a> (xo,"o),ß)] = £*<"")[ "ol f= ZF" + AC + ^OD-DET, we clearly have that 
e Lx(x).
Thus we conclude that for each real z there is an additively closed ordinal X > co and a real y with z < Ty such that Lx[x] ï£ OD-DET. (Take an x as before and let y = (z, x).) By Skolem-Löwenheim we have now that Vz3^ >7-z3X(X < o3x A X > co A X is additively closed Aljj] fet OD-DET). Thus y > y0 =* X(y) is defined. Also as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, (i) ZFC + OD-DET.
(u) ZFC + aVdet.
Our next result improves this to an optimal form and establishes the equiconsistency of lightface and boldface forms of determinacy at this level. But this is immediate from the fact that the theory ZFW relativizes to inner models of the form L[y] for y a real (see for example Gostanian [G] ).
To prove that (ii) and (iii) are equiconsistent and (b) it is enough to establish the latter. So fix large enough TV. We shall prove that ZFC + Pr AVDET Schema I-Con(ZFC + Pr^AVDET).
The idea is similar to that in the proof of Theorem 2.3(b).
As in the preceding argument we can find an x e R and ■& < <¿x such that Ljx] 1= ZF" + AC + OD-DET. Let M = HOD7-»1*1, M1 = {z e M: rank M(z) < cof»'*1}. Since LJx] \= OD-DET we can see as in the proof of 2.2 that cof»w is measurable in M, so M1 1= ZFC. So it is enough to check that M \= Pr^AVDET. So let x, $ be respectively 22, n2 formulas such that M \= "ZF^ + DC h-x ** </'"• Let ß0 e M. We want to prove that M t="{a: x(a> A))} ¡s determined". Since M is an co-model we clearly have that ZF^ + DC l-x ** "Is thus we also have that L9(x) Nx°f
So LJx] l="{a:
X(a, ß0)} is a AVßo) set". Since ß0 e HOD'-»1'1, the proof of the 3rd Periodicity 
This is because
(1) The statement "Vx e R3M (M is a standard model of ZFC containing x)" follows from " Vx e R(x* exists)" and hence from IIJ-DET, and so a fortiori from PrAVDET. and a fortiori the consistency of the weaker theory (where Pr AVDET is replaced by Pr AVDET) mentioned above.
Remark. If ZFC + a is an extension of ZFC by some further hypothesis for which we can construct canonical inner models (e.g. a =" There exists an inaccessible", a ="Vx e R (x* exists)", a ="3 a measurable cardinal", a ="AVDET" etc.), then we can calculate by similar techniques levels of lightface determinacy T-DET such that ZFC + a + OD-DET is equiconsistent with ZFC + a + T-DET. If for instance a relativizes to the L[x]'s for x e R,T = A:2 will work again. If a = " Vx e R (x* exists)" a rough calculation will give that T = D(u2 + 1 -Illx) will work (instead of L[x] one uses L# [x] , the smallest inner model of ZFC containing x and closed under sharps for reals). Similarly for stronger hypotheses. In these cases the theory ZFC + a + OD-DET can be quite strong. For instance we have that ZFC + Vx e R (x* exists) + OD-DET is stronger than AVDET (boldface!).
5. Equivalent forms of determinacy. We can also use the ideas of §3 to find a simple proof of a generalization of Martin's Theorem that ZF + DC h-AV-DET => 22"-DET.
To illustrate the idea let us give first a new proof that ZF + DC I-AVDET => 22-DET (the argument clearly relativizes to produce its boldface form). Our general result is an abstraction of the basic idea in this argument.
Assume ZF + DC + AX2-DET. We will show 2VDET. Let <p(a) be a 22 formula. If L[x] l="II has a winning strategy in {a: <p(a)}" for some real x, then since this is a 2j statement, II has (in the real world) a winning strategy in {a: <p(a)} and we are done. So we can assume that for all reals x, L[x] f="II has no winning strategy in {a: <p(a)}". So by Skolem-Löwenheim Vx e R3# < cojL^x] 1= ZF^ + "II has no winning strategy in {a: <p(a)}" for some fixed large enough TV. Thus let for each real x, #(x) = leasts < coj such that L^[x] \= ZF^ + "II has no winning strategy in (a: <p(a)}".
Consider then the following game G:
This is clearly a A:2 game, so it is determined. If II has a winning strategy r, then as in §3 we can see easily that LS(t) [t] l="II has a winning strategy in {a: <p(a)}", which is a contradiction. So assume that I has a winning strategy a. We claim then that the strategy
is winning in the original game [a: <p(a)}. Indeed, if a, ß, x are given by (*), then L&(x)[x] 1= <p((a, /?)). But op is 22, so <p((a, ß)) holds in the real world.
We state now our general theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Assume ZF + DC. Let T be a pointclass containing all the recursive pointsets, which is (¿-parametrized, has the prewellordering property and is closed under A, V, 3 u, V*\ recursive substitutions and 3 R. Then A-DET => T-DET.
Here of course A = T n f, where f={~^4:^4Gr} = the dual pointclass of T. Proof of the theorem. Work in ZF + DC and assume A-DET. Let A e R be a set in T. Let W e co X R be universal for T and such that for all x e R, Wx = {n: W(n, x)} is a T(x)-complete subset of co, in particular Wx é A(x). Let m: W -» ORD be a T-norm on Wand let e0 e co be such that a e A <=> (e0, a) e W. Assume II has no winning strategy in A. We shall produce a winning strategy for I in A.
If t is a strategy for player II and I plays a real a, denote by r*a the real that II plays following t against a. So we have Vt3û:((o:, r*a) e A). So in particular for each x e R, Vt <rx3a((a, T*a) e A).
We claim now that (*) Vx3«[(«, x) e W A Vt <rx3a(cp(e0, (a, r*a)) < <p(«, x))].
If not, then for some x e R and all « g co:
Vt ^Tx3a(e0, (a, r*a)) <f (n, x) => («, x) £ W, where
License or copyright restrictions may apply to redistribution; see https://www.ams.org/journal-terms-of-use so that since cp is a T-norm, < * e T. Therefore (n,x) G W <=> VT<rx3a((e0, (a,r*a)) <*(n,x)),
i.e. If* G f (x) so IF* g A(x), a contradiction. By the Number Uniformization Theorem (see [Mol, p. 202] ), from (*) we have that there is a function F: R -> co with A graph such that Vx[ (F(x),x) G IFA VT<rx3a((e0, (a> f »a)') < ■* (F(x), x))\.
Consider now the following game G:
<x,x ß Since (F(x), x) g W for all x, this is a A game so it is determined. If II has a winning strategy r' consider the strategy t (for the original game A) which for each real a that I plays, it replies by playing r*a = ß, where ß = r'*(a, t'). Clearly t < tt' so 3«[(e0,(a,r*«»<;(F(T'),T')].
Fix such an a. If I plays a, r' in G then II replies by ß = r'*(a, r') = r*a and since he wins we have^[ (,0,(«,t*«))<;(F(t'),t')], a contradiction.
So I has a winning strategy a in G. We claim that forgetting about his extra move x, this is also a winning strategy for A. Indeed, if II plays ß, I following a produces a and an auxiliary x such that (e0,(«,/8»<;(F(x),x), in particular (e0, (a, ß)) e W, i.e. (a, ß) e A and we are done.
Remark. Note that in Theorem 5.1 the assumption that T is closed under 3R is necessary. To see this consider T = n}.
Part II. Hierarchy Theorems 6. Review of standard notions and statement of the main theorem. 6.1. We say that a pointclass V is almost adequate if it contains all the recursive pointsets and is closed under A, V and recursive substitutions. As in [Mol] T is adequate if it is also closed under bounded number quantification. (The class of < co2 -n} sets (to be defined presently) is almost adequate but not adequate).
A coding of a pointclass T is a surjection (the coding map, <p) of a subset C of R (the set of codes) onto {A eR: A e T). A coded pointclass is a pointclass T together with a coding of T.
A coded pointclass is almost adequate if the underlying pointclass is almost adequate, and the various closure properties involved in the notion of "almost adequate pointclass" hold " uniformly in the codes". Thus, for example, if T is an almost adequate coded pointclass, there will be recursive functions F^RxR^R, F2: co X R ^ R such that:
(1) If a and ß are T-codes (for the sets A, Brespectively), then Fx(a, ß) is a T-code for A U B.
(2) If a is a T-code for A and e is the Gödel number of the total recursive function G: R -> R, then F2(e, a) is a T-code for G'l [A] .
Similarly if we say that a coded pointclass has some other closure property (e.g. closure under complementation) we mean the underlying pointclass has the closure property " uniformly in the codes". 6.2. Now let T be an almost adequate coded class. By a T-norm on a set A, we mean a map tp: A -* X, such that (setting cp(x) = oo for x <£ A) the relations (1) x^*y »x eA A <p(x) < <p(y),
x<*y^xeA A <p(x) < <p(y) lie in T.
By a T-code for cp we mean a pair (a, ß) where a T-codes (1), and ß T-codes (2) when (1), (2) are coded in the obvious way as subsets of R.
We say that a coded pointclass T has the weak scale property if there is a recursive map F:coXR->RxR and for each T-code a (of A, say) there exists a scale {<p"} on A such that F(n, a) is a T-code for <p".
This definition is different from that of the scale property in [Mol] , There, the relations {(«, x, y): x ^* y) and {(«, x, y): x <* y) are required to lie in T. We only require the pieces (for each fixed n) to lie in T uniformly in the codes.
6.3. We now formulate the version of the "3rd Periodicity Theorem" which we will need for our proofs.
Theorem (Moschovakis [Mol] ). Let T be an almost adequate coded pointclass with the weak scale property. Let a be a T-code for A e R. Suppose that every game, whose payoff set has a T-code recursive in a, is determined.
Then if player I wins the game A, I has a winning strategy recursive (uniformly in a) in { e : [e)a is total and is a T-code for a game won by player I} .
(Here, {e}a is the function partial recursive in a with Gödel number e.)
The theorem as formulated here is a slight variant of Theorem 6E.1 of [Mol] , and has " the same proof as that theorem.
6.4. Let T be a pointclass and fFa collection of partial functions with domain and range a subset of R. Then T is closed under substitution by members of ^if whenever / g J^and A e T, then there is a B e T such that whenever/(x) is defined, x e B <->/(x) g A. The particular class $■* that comes up in our applications is a subclass of the functions with 2° graphs. Say that/is nice 2° if there is a g: R -» to, partial with a Ylf graph, and a partial recursive function h: oiXR^R such that f(x) = h(g(x),x). 6.5. We next recall the notion of an £ -II} set. Let | be a countable ordinal. Set (Af. Tj < £) as a ¿-sequence of subsets of R. Set A^= 0. Then the difference kernel of the sequence (Af. y < £) is the set {x: The least tj such that x <£ A is odd}.
A is £ -IT} if A is the difference kernel of a £ sequence of TI} sets. A is < £ -H.} if it is £' -TI} for some £' < £. If X is a limit ordinal, then A is (X -1) -n} if A is the difference kernel of a X-sequence of 11} sets, (Aç, £ < X) such that ní<x ^ = 0.
We shall need the corresponding lightface classes of £ -n} sets. We shall give a definition for £ = co2. An analogous definition can be given for any £ for which we know which are the "recursive" maps of £ onto co (for example, any £ < co"). By a more complicated discussion, one can give a definition of £ -n} for any £ < uxK.
Let A be a Yl\ subset of co X R. Let, for 17 < co2, A(r¡) be defined as follows: if r¡ = u ■ j + k, AM = {x: (2^3*, x) e A). Let B be the difference kernel of (A^, r\ < co2). Then as A ranges over the n} subsets of co X R, B will range over the co2 -n} subsets of R. The notion of < co2 -n} sets and (co2 -1) -Yl\ sets are defined similarly by analogy with the corresponding boldface definitions.
6.6. Main Theorem. Let A be coded point class. We make the following assumptions on A:
(i) A is almost adequate; (ii) A is closed under complementation; (iii) A has the weak scale property; (iv) The class C of A-codes is R. Let {a >-» Sa) be the coding map. Let S = {(a, ß): ß e Sa). Then for some N > 1, S is A\+l.
(v) If N > 2, we assume 2}^ e A.
(Of course the closure properties of A expressed in (i), (ii), (iii) and (v) should hold " uniformly in the codes ".) Let <p(x, y), ¡p(x, y) be respectively 2^+1 and U1N+1 formulas defining S. Let ax be the sentence (Vx, y)[<p(x, y) <-> i//(x, y)]. Let a2 be a sentence (of the language of set theory) expressing the various properties assumed of A (defining A, using cp, in the evident way). We want a2 to mention the specific Gödel numbers of the recursive functions giving the "uniformities in the codes". Finally, we express "A-DET" as a sentence of the language of set theory using the definition of A in terms of cp. Then there is a game G, explicitly and uniformly definable from the data just described (A, cp, \p, etc.) (In particular, G will be a AV+1 game.)
6.7. The case TV > 2 of the Main Theorem seems, at first glance, to be contrary to the main results of Part I of this paper. For the game G will certainly be ordinal definable. And we showed in Part I that "ZFC + AVDET" has strictly greater consistency strength than "ZFC + OD-DET".
If one analyzes this situation, one gets the following: "ZFC + OD-DET" cannot prove (except via an inconsistency) that there is a class A containing 22 and satisfying the hypotheses of the Main Theorem, of which of course the only crucial one is the weak scale property.
Indeed, we know only a few ways of producing scales on pointclasses at IT2 or beyond. They all require boldface determinacy hypotheses to work.
(1) Assuming (Vx g R) (x* exists), one can put a scale on Tl\ sets (using the method of [MS] ).
(2) Assuming AV-DET, one can show that the pointclasses H\k+X and 22A + 2 have the scale property (cf. [Mol, Theorems 6.C.2 and 6.C.3, "The Second Periodicity Theorem"]). It will follow that many pointclasses intermediate between 22/t and A12k + 2 will also have the scale property.
(3) If T is an adequate pointclass, closed under continuous preimages, and with the scale property and every T-game is determined, then the class DT has the scale property [Mol, Exercise 6E.15] . For a discussion of the game quantifier see [Mol, §6D] . This seems the most fruitful way, at present, to get interesting classes, to which the Main Theorem applies, beyond AV 6.8. We next recall the basic closure properties of the £ -n} sets.
(1) Let (A , Tj < £) be a £-sequence of subsets of R. Set Bv = D^<fl A , for tj < £.
Then (A , r\ < £) and (B , r\ < £) have the same difference kernel. Thus, without loss of generality, we may assume that we take the difference kernel only of decreasing £-sequences. This makes contact with the discussion of the difference hierarchy in [Hf, §17] . The remaining facts we cite follow readily from that discussion.
(2) Let (A , tj < £> be a decreasing £-sequence of n} sets. If tj > £, let Av = 0.
Let A be the difference kernel of (A^, tj < £). Then a= u K-^Vi].
r¡ < £ ; n even Thus every £ -n} set is a countable union of finite Boolean combinations of n} sets.
(3) If A isYl\,A isl -n}. (4) If £ < ê, every £ -TI} set is # -n}.
(5) If A is£ -n}, ~ A is£ + 1 -n}.
(6) The class of < co -II} sets is precisely the class of finite Boolean combinations of n} sets.
(7) Let X be an additively closed limit ordinal. Then the < X -TI} sets and the (X -1) -n} sets are closed under finite Boolean operations. The obvious lightface analogues of (l)- (7) hold, with "the same proofs". If the reader wishes to avoid tracking down the proof of (7), he can replace in Theorems A and B the class of (co2 -1) -n} sets by a slightly larger class which is manifestly closed under finite Boolean operations. For example let 2°(n}) denote the class of countable unions of finite Boolean combinations of n} sets. Let 21°(TI}) denote the obvious lightface variant. Let A°(n}) consist of those ^çR such that A, A lie in 2°(n}). Then if we replace (ii) in the Main Theorem by (ii'): T contains all A°(TI}) sets, we get a variant which we can prove without reference to the results of [Hf, §17] . 6.9. Finally, we wish to recall some results of Martin and Harrington.
(a) Theorem (Martin, Harrington [Mai, Ma2 and H] ). The following are equivalent:
(1) n}-DET.
(2)(<co2-n})-DET. (3) 0* exists.
By relativization, this theorem has the following boldface corollary:
The following are equivalent:
(1) n}-DET,
(Vx g R)(x* exists).
(c) Theorem (Martin [Ma2] ). The following are equivalent:
(l)(co2+ 1 -n})-DET.
(2)(< co2 + co2-n})-DET. (3) 0+ exists. Now ZFC + 0+ exists I-Con(ZFC + 3 measurable cardinal). Hence ZFC + (co2 + 1 -n})-DET 1-Con(ZFC + TI}-DET).
Our original version of the Main Theorem had the additional hypothesis that every game in A is determined. It was the theorem of Martin just cited that led us to look for a version with a "single game" determinacy hypothesis. Our first proof of a "single game" version used an unpublished "generic encoding" technique of Kunen. The present simpler proof evolved from suggestions of Martin, after he heard a talk on our earlier proof.
7. The key game. 7.1. Let A be as in the statement of the Main Theorem. Let the sentence a be the conjunction of ax and a2 of that theorem and of a large finite subset of the axioms of ZFC (sufficiently large to carry out the usual arguments of descriptive set theory, as well as the usual theory of the T^'s).
Let E e R be {a: Sa is a game won by player I}. For £ g ORD, we define L^[E], by induction on £, as follows: L0[E]= 0; Ln + X[E] consists of all first-order definable subsets of the structure (L^E];
e, E D LV[E]); for X a limit ordinal, A-DET will eventually turn out to be La[E\.
7.2. The following lemma is the place in our argument where we use our assumption that A has the weak scale property. Proof. By (1), there is a winning strategy for I in Sa, r, lying in L[E]. In the presence of a, the assertion "t is a winning strategy for I in Sa" is a nV+1 assertion about t and a. Holding in V, it holds in L[E], by (3).
Lemma. L[E]\= a. If Sa is determined for every a e L[F] n R, then L[E]\=
7.3. We now give an informal description of the crucial game G. A more formal description will follow in §7.4.
In G, player II will begin by answering a question about the "sharp" of the model L[E]. He will also provide "documentation" to support his description and will defend it against the challenges of player I. The game will be designed so that II can defeat any strategy for I by " telling the truth". Hence, if G is determined, II must win. But Ts opportunities for challenging II will be sufficiently abundant that II can only win by telling the truth.
In more detail, the game proceeds as follows. Let £Cf be the language of set theory augmented by a one place predicate symbol E, and an infinite stock of constant symbols c0, cx,_
(1) I plays a sentence x of JS?,.
(2) II plays a "truth value" for x in {0,1}. (Say 1 ="truth"; 0 = "falsehood".)
License or copyright restrictions may apply to redistribution; see https://www.ams.org/journal-terms-of-use (3) Let n be the least integer such that no c, appears in x with i > n. I and II will "cooperatively produce" countable ordinals X0 < Xf < • ■ • < X". (The meaning of the phrase in quotes will be spelled out below.) (4) II will play the satisfaction relation of some structure (co; R), with R a binary relation on co. For II to stay in the game, (co; R) must be a well-founded model of a. Let tr: (co, R) = (M, e) be the transitive collapse map.
In addition, M must satisfy the following requirements: (2), provided we interpret E by EM C\ Lx [E]M, and interpret c, by X, for i < n.
(5) At certain points during the game I may issue a "challenge" to II. At any given time, at most one challenge will be in effect. Thus each new challenge of I will have the side effect of revoking all earlier challenges.
When I issues a challenge, he points to a real a in M (by naming the integer j such that tr(j) = a), a should be such that M f="I does not win Sf. Players I and II begin playing Sa (on the side). If I issues a later challenge, this partial play of Sa is scrapped. For I to win, he must issue a last challenge, and win the play of the corresponding game.
This completes our sketch of the rules of G. A more complete (and more formal) description of G will follow in a moment.
7.4. Let a be the element of R that records Ts moves during a play of G, and let ß e R record ITs moves.
We let ax(n) = a(3n + 1), a2(n) = a(3n + 2), a3(n) = a(3n + 3). Let ßx, ß2, ß3 be defined analogously from ß. With respect to the outline in §7.3, these will serve the following functions: a(0) will encode the x of (1); ß(0) will encode ITs assignment of a truth value to Xax and ßx will be reserved for the cooperative production of ordinals as mentioned in (3). ß2 will be devoted to encoding the model M, and its satisfaction relation (cf. (4) of §7.3).
a2 will be the place where I records his challenges. Each m such that a2(m) > 0 represents a challenge by I.
The reals a3 and ß3 are used to record the moves of players I and II in the subsidiary games resulting from Ts challenges.
7.5. The following clauses determine who wins G if the play is the pair (a, ß). The winner is determined by the first clause that applies.
(1) We fix a recursive Gödel numbering of ££v If a (0) is not the Gödel number of a sentence of Sfx, I loses.
(2)IfjS(0)> 1,11 loses.
(3) To each ordinal £ < co • (n + 1), we associate reals a, £, ßf> as follows: Let | = co i j + k. Then ax ¿(m) = ax(2j3k5m). ßxi is defined analogously from ßf. (Here n is as defined in §7.3(3).) Clause (3) will apply just in case for some £ < co • (n + 1), one of ax £, ßx £ does not code a countable ordinal. (For the usual coding of countable ordinals by reals, see [Mol, §4.A.2] .) In that case, let £ be least such that one of a1(, ßxi does not code an ordinal. If ax¿ does not code an ordinal, II wins. Otherwise, I wins.
If clause (3) does not apply, we define countable ordinals X0,... ,Xn as follows:
= sup{|au|,|j8u|:í<to-(y + l)}.
(Here if y g R codes an ordinal, |y| is that ordinal.) Clause (4) will cause II to lose unless ß2 encodes a suitable model M. We let ^2 be the language of set theory enriched by a constant m for each m in co. II will lose unless all of the following happen:
(a) {m: ß2(m) =t 0} is the set of Gödel numbers of sentences in some complete consistent theory in the language JS?2. This completes our formal specification of the game G. The reader is advised to convince himself that clause (5) captures our informal discussion of challenges.
7.6. The device of "cooperatively producing ordinals" used in clause (3) of §7.5 goes back to an unpublished proof of Solovay (see however [Ke2] ) that AD implies that Uf is measurable. The following lemma, due to Martin in a slightly different context, is the key to the present application of this device.
Lemma. Let r be a winning strategy for I in G. Let n be determined from Y s first move according to t as in §7.3(3). Let 8Q < 8X < • ■ • < 8nbe countable ordinals which are limit points of ordinals admissible in r. Then there is a real y such that whenever (a, ß) is a play of G in which I plays according to r, ß(0) < 1 and ßx = y, then in the resulting play, none of clauses (1) through (3) of §7.5 will apply. Moreover the ordinals X0,... ,Xn determined at the end of clause (3) will take on the values 80,... ,8n.
Proof. Let (6¡, i < co ■ (n + 1)) be an increasing sequence of T-admissibles such that 8j = sup{0,: i < co -(j + 1)) forj < n.
We choose y so that whenever ßx = y, ßXi codes the ordinal 6¡. Suppose then that I plays according to the strategy t, and II plays so that ß(0) < 1 and ßx = y. Let the resulting sequence of Ts moves be a. In deciding who wins, clause (1) does not apply (since t wins for I), and clause (2) does not apply (since ß(0) < 1). If clause (3) applied, then since t wins for I, some ßx ¡ fails to code an ordinal (i < co ■ (n + 1)), contrary to our choice of y ( = ßx) .
It remains to see that X, = 5. for y < n. For this it suffices to show:
Claim. \axJ < 6¡+x for /' < co • (n + 1).
Let y be a real in which t is recursive and such that a, < co{ < 6i+x. (y can be obtained by interweaving t and a suitably generic code for 6¡.)
Consider the set of reals T= {z: (3a, ß)(ß(0) < 1 A (\/j < i)(ßhJ codes an ordinal < 6f), and a is the real I obtains by playing the strategy t against ß and z = «i,,)}-Then T is clearly a 2}(j>) set of reals. Since t wins for I, any z e T codes an ordinal. Hence, by the boundedness theorem (cf. [Mol, §4A.4]) any z e T codes an ordinal < u{ < 0i + x. In particular if a is as in our claim, alt e T. So the claim and hence the lemma is proved. D
In an entirely analogous fashion one can show:
Lemma. Let t be a winning strategy for player II in G. Let (8¡, i e co) be a strictly increasing sequence of countable ordinals such that each 8¡ is a limit of admissibles in t. Then there is a real y so that whenever I plays a such that a(0) is the Gödel number of a sentence of ä'x and ax = y, and II plays according to t, then in the resulting play, clauses (1) through (3) do not apply, andX¡ = 8jfor 0 < i < n.
1.1. Lemma. Player I does not win G.
Proof.
Suppose to the contrary that I wins G via the strategy t. We shall construct a play for II in which he defeats t, getting the desired contradiction. As we indicated previously, the basic idea behind the proof of the lemma is that II can defeat I by " telling the truth."
Let x be the sentence of ££x that I plays on his first move, and let n be determined from x, as usual. Let 8x,...,8n be the first « + 1 limits of T-admissible ordinals. II sets ß(0) = 1 (respectively 0) according to whether Ls [E] 1= x or not when F is interpreted by F n LS [E] , and c0,...,c"_1 by ô0,...,5n_1. Let yx be the real provided by the first lemma in §7.6 such that if ßx = yx, then X0,... ,X" will take on the values 50,... ,8n. II will choose ß so that ßx does equal y1.
Let 0 be a limit ordinal > co, such that Ve 1= a. Let Mx be a countable elementary submodel of Ve with 8n U {8n) e Mx. Let M0 be the transitivization of Mx. Since TVf0 is countable, we can clearly choose y2 so that if ß2 = y2, then M will equal M0. II will choose ß2 so that ß2 = y2. It is clear that no matter how II chooses ß3, if I plays according to t, then the resulting play of G, II will not lose according to clauses (1) through (4).
In all plays of G considered until this lemma is proved, I will play according to the strategy t, and II will choose ß(0), ßx and ß2 as previously indicated.
We say that a finite sequence s of integers is special if whenever ß3(i) = s (i) for / < length(j), then a2(length^)) > 0. Claim 1. Special sequences exist. Proof. Let II play ß3(m) = 0, all m. Since I wins, a2(m) > 0 for some m. But a2(m) = a(3m + 2) is determined by t without knowledge of ß3(j) = ß(3j + 3) for j > m. So if s is a sequence of 0's of length m, s is special. Say that s is maximal special if s is special and no proper end extension of s is special.
Claim 2. Maximal special sequences exist. Deny. Then we can define a sequence (s¡, i < co), where s¡ is special of length w, and m0 < mx < m2 ■ ■ ■ and sj+x end-extends s¡. The union of the s ¡'s is an element of R, y3. Have II play ß such that ß3 = y3. Since ß3 extends s¡, a2(mf) > 0. So I loses, since a2(m) > 0 for infinitely many m. This contradicts t's being a winning strategy for G.
Fix a maximal special sequence, s0, of length mQ. From now on, we only consider plays of II in which ß3 f m0 = s0. The value of a2(mf) clearly does not depend on the value of ß3(j) for j > m0. Say a2(mf) = k + 1. Also in a play of G in which ß3 I ma = s0, we have a2(m) = 0 for m 3* m0 + 1. (If not, ß3 ï m would be a special sequence which is a proper end extension of s0, contrary to the choice of s0.)
We now define a strategy t* for I. Let t be a finite sequence of integers. Then t*(í) is the value a3(length (t) + mf) takes when ß3 \ m0 + length(i) is s0 t.
The significance of t* is as follows. Let (a, ß) be any play of G in which I plays according to t, and II plays a ß with ß(0), ßx, ß2 as described above and ß3{ m0 = s0. Then clauses (1) through (4) and clauses (5)(a) and (5)(b) of §7.5 will not apply. The last m such that a2(m) > 0 will be m0. Let tr: co -» M be the canonical enumeration determined by ß2. Since clause (5)(b) does not apply (since t is a winning strategy for I), ir(k) is a real, y2, in R n M, and M N"I does not win Sy". In clause (5)(c) a certain play of Sy2 is examined. In this play of Sy2, I plays according to t*.
Let trx: M ~* Vg be the inverse of the transitive collapse of Mx. Then trx is an elementary embedding, so Ve l="I does not win Sy ". It follows that there is a real /?* such that if II plays ß* and I plays according to t*, I will not win Syi. Now let ß3 be chosen equal to s0 /?*, and let II choose y8(0), ßf, ß2 as previously indicated. Let I play according to t. Then in the play of Sy2 evaluated in (5)(c), II plays ß* and I plays according to r*. By our choice of ß*, II will win this play of Sy . So II wins the play of G. But this contradicts t being a winning strategy for I in G.
7.8. Assume now that G is determined. By Lemma 7.7, II wins. We fix a winning strategy, t, for II once and for all. In all the plays of G considered from now on, II will play according to the strategy t. Our next lemma has the following intuitive content. By exploiting the ability to challenge II, player I can insure that player II " tells the truth".
License or copyright restrictions may apply to redistribution; see https://www.ams.org/journal-terms-of-use Lemma. Let x be a sentence of £CX. Let (8¡; i < co) be an increasing sequence of countable ordinals, each of which is a limit of r-admissible ordinals. Let X be a countable subset ofR. Then there is a play (a, ß) of G such that:
(1) o(0) = V- (2) For i <n,\,= 8,, Proof. Select Yj by the second lemma of §7.6 such that if a(0) = rxn and ax = yx, then (2) will hold. From now till the end of the proof of this lemma, all plays of G considered will have a(0) = rx~' and ax = YiLet Xx = {y e X: II does not win Sy}. If Xx is empty, the lemma is trivial. So assume X1 ¥> 0.
We fix an enumeration, ((«,, x,) ; i e co), of co X Xx. We are going to construct a2, a3 in stages. At the beginning of the iih stage, we will have determined a2 \ m¡; a3 l m¡. We will have mi+x > m¡. Thus after countably many stages, we will have determined a2 and a3 and thus a play of G. We will show then that this play of G satisfies the conditions of the lemma. (To start things off, we will take m0 = 0.)
We will say that the ith stage is terminated if one of the following happens:
(i)ß2Cn,eR?) = 0.
(ii) ß2(rl does not win the game with A-code nP) = 0. (iii) For some r and k with x¡(r) = k, ß2(r(r, k) e nP) = 0. Thus the z'th stage is never terminated iff ir(n¡) = x, and M 1= "I does not win the game with A-code x,".
Suppose we are at the beginning of the z'th stage. A pair of finite sequences (s, t) is a terminator for the z'th stage if: (5) If a2 extends a2 [ m¡ s and a3 extends a3 f m¡ t, then for some y < length(i), ¿82(i) = 0 and this is sufficient for the z'th stage to be terminated (under one of (i) through (iii) above).
Claim. A terminator for the z'th stage exists (for every z). Granted the claim we prove the lemma as follows. We construct a2 and a3 stage by stage as indicated previously. To get from stage i to stage i + 1, we pick a terminator (s, t) for stage z and set: mi + 1 = m¡ + length(í); o¡2 \ m¡ + 1 = a2 { m¡ s; a3 I" mi+i = a3 I" m¡ '■ At the end of the construction we will have determined a2 and a3 and hence a play (a, ß) of G in which II plays according to t. By previous remarks this play will satisfy (1) and (2) of the lemma. We must show that it satisfies (3).
Then let y G X n M such that II does not win the game Sy. Then y g Xx, so we can find i such that tr(nf) = y, and x, = y. Since stage i was terminated, we must have M 1= "I wins S".
It remains to prove the claim. We suppose the claim is false and show how I can defeat t (contradicting the fact that t is a winning strategy for II).
I will play a(0), ax as previously indicated. He will play a2 Ï m¡ as previously selected. He will set a2(m¡) = «, + 1 and a2(y) = 0 for y > m,. In any play we consider from now on a2 will be as just described. Moreover a3 \ m¡ will be as decided before stage i.
In any such play, tt(zz,) = x¡ and M 1="I does not win Sx". Thus in any such play, clauses (1) through (4), and clauses (5)(a) and (5)(b) of §7.5 will not apply, and the winner of G will be determined by who wins the "game within the game" Gv.
We define a strategy t* for II as follows. Let 5 be a finite sequence of integers of length m. Suppose that I plays a3 extending a3 \ m0s. Then the value of ß3(m -1) is well defined (since ß3(m -1) = ß(3m), and for y 3* m a3(j) = o¡(3y' + 3), which is not seen by t when deciding ß(3m)). We take this value to be r*(s). The significance of t* is that in the "game within the game", II plays according to t*. Now since x, g Xv II does not win Sx . So there is an a* such that if I plays a* and II plays according to t*, then I will win Sx . We now define a3(m! + j) to be a*(j). Then if I plays a, in the "game within the game" he will play a*, and win G according to clause (5)(c). This contradicts the fact that t wins G for II, and proves our claim. This completes the proof of Lemma 7.8. 7.9. Lemma. Let xbe a sentence of5£v Let n be least such that no c¡ appears in xfor i > n. Let 8Q < 8X < ■ ■ • < 8n be ordinals which are limit points of the class of t admissible ordinals. Interpret S£f in LS[E] by letting c¡ denote 8, for i < n, and letting E denote E n LS [E] . Then t^x"1» =' 1 iff LS[E] 1= X-
Proof. An easy Skolem-Löwenheim argument shows that we may as well assume the 8fs are countable. We apply Lemma 7.8, taking X to be R n Ls [E] . We get a play of G in which II plays according to t, and X, = 8¡ for i < n. Let M be the transitive model of a determined by ß2. It suffices to prove EM n Ls Suppose first that x e E. Then I wins Sx. So II does not win 5"x. By (3) of Lemma 7.8, M 1= "I wins Sx". I.e., x g Em, a contradiction.
Suppose next that x é E. We can find x* recursive in x such that V and M both think Sx. = {n y: n e co and y £ Sx}.
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